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1 Introduction
The prevailing consensus is that proper institutions are central for growth (e.g. Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson, 2001). One possible consequence of ineﬃcient institutions is crime. In
developing countries, formal institutions seem often powerless to deal with crime and may sometimes
be facilitating it, and therefore non-governmental institutions may play a key role in combating it.
We study the eﬀect of microcredit on crime at the household (micro) and the village (aggregate)
level both by constructing a theoretical model of crime and by using household level survey data
from rural Bangladesh to conduct an empirical investigation. As an institution, microcredit is
interesting both because it has been shown to have beneﬁcial household and village level eﬀects
(e.g. Pitt and Khandker 1998, Karlan and Morduch 2009 and Banerjee and Duﬂo 2010) and because
it seems to ﬁll a relative vacuum when many formal institutions such as police and courts are weak.1
Microcredit may lead to a lower probability of crime through various mechanisms, including
the group incentive schemes for which microcredit is famous.2 Besides the group liability mecha-
nism,3microcredit may aﬀect the level of crime faced by households through other means: Group-
based credit organizations teach their members to take responsibility of their group's members. For
example, Grameen Bank's social development program recommends that its members should not
inﬂict injustice on anyone, should not allow anyone to do so, and should always be ready to help
others. Furthermore, the type of social interaction that program participants undertake via weekly
group meetings may also encourage them to deal with criminal gangs more eﬃciently. Weekly
group meetings allow borrowers to obtain more information about diﬀerent issues relative to the
1There is a relatively large literature studying the eﬀects of microcredit in Bangladesh. See e.g. Khandker
(2005, 2009) and Khandker, Khalily, and Khan (2005) for studies on microcredit performance. McKernan, Pitt and
Roskowitz (2004) and Pitt, Khandker and Cartwright (2003) study the eﬀect of gender in the use of the formal and
informal ﬁnancial sectors. Morduch (1998) and Zaman (2000) study whether microcredit helps the poor, and Pitt,
Khandker, Chowdury and Millimet (2001) the eﬀect of microcredit on the health status of children. This interest on
Bangladeshi microcredit is partly explained by the fact that microcredit originates in Bangladesh (Yunus 2004 tells
the story).
2 The group liability mechanism makes group members jointly responsible for the default of any member of the
group.
3There have been attempts in Bangladesh to transform the microcredit towards individual liability but in practice
group lending and liability has continued (see Collins et. al. 2009).
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non-borrower households. Additional information helps to alter the social attitudes of program
participants (Pitt and Khandker, 1998) and may facilitate a higher ability to deal with criminal
gangs. Another reason why microcredit borrowers may face less crime than non-borrowers is that
the credit programs protect their members by providing them with legal services in case of victimiza-
tion.4 Furthermore, these credit organizations possess the strongest social networks in Bangladesh,
with signiﬁcant economic and political backing. They have the incentives and the means to force
local administration and legal authorities to protect their members. Criminal gangs are presum-
ably aware of the inﬂuence of credit organizations and therefore may refrain from harassing their
customers.
To analyze the eﬀect of microcredit on crime, we ﬁrst build a theoretical model: A criminal
gang has to decide which households in a village to attack. The size of the booty obtained from
a given household is a function of the amount of resources devoted to robbing that household;
households, for their part, can invest in protection. At the village level, microcredit has income
externalities through the labor market, making non-participating poor households richer through
higher wages (they supply labor) and (non-participating) rich households poorer (as they demand
labor). Microcredit increases the income of participating households. To capture the eﬀects of
microcredit discussed above, we assume that borrowers are partially sheltered from crime through
lower marginal cost of protection. Microcredit has then two eﬀects on crime: A diversion eﬀect and
a scale eﬀect. The diversion eﬀect is heterogenous both for borrower and non-borrower households.
The labor market-based microcredit externality makes poor non-borrower households richer and
rich non-borrower households poorer relative to the counterfactual of no microcredit. The former
and some rich non-borrowers become more, some rich non-borrowers less attractive targets of crime,
but the average eﬀect is ambiguous. For borrowers, the situation is more complicated. The direct
income eﬀect is positive, making them more attractive targets; at the same time, the lower cost
of protection makes them less attractive targets. The overall eﬀect varies over households. The
scale eﬀect means that on the one hand, as microcredit increases aggregate income, the village
as a whole becomes a more attractive target for the criminal gang which direct more resources
4See e.g. http://www.brac.net/content/bangladesh-legal-empowerment, accessed Jan 11, 2011.
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to attack villagers. On the other hand, the increased ability of the (borrower, and thereby also
the average) households to protect themselves makes the village less attractive for the gang. We
show numerically that even by the diversion eﬀect alone the household level treatment eﬀect of
microcredit on crime may be negative (crime is reduced) while the village level eﬀect is positive
(crime is increased).
Our study contributes thus also to the research on the externalities and eﬃciency of private
property protection. At the theoretical level several externalities associated with private property
protection have been found (Cook 1986). These and their sign depend on the nature of the protec-
tion, e.g. on whether protection is observable or unobservable (Shavell 1991, Hotte and Ypersele
2008). Empirical research seems to be very scarce, however. Unobservable protection against crime
can have positive externalities, and Ayres and Levitt (1998) ﬁnd evidence for these. In our case
the protection measure, support by a microﬁnance institution, is publicly known. Thus, in our case
one would expect protection to generate negative external eﬀects through diverting crime to other
people. We provide evidence on the aggregate strength of this diversion eﬀect. To the best of our
knowledge, our paper is the ﬁrst to do this. There is related empirical research on crime avoidance,
i.e., on actions to avoid crime. Among them one can mention the work by Cullen and Levitt (1999,
see also Levitt 1999). Closest to ours is the work by Di Tella, Galiani, and Schargrodsky (2006).
They focus on the diﬀerences in victimization and in crime avoidance measures at diﬀerent levels of
income using cross-sectional survey data from Argentina, but do not measure the spill-overs from
avoidance measures by a given group. Studies on the impacts of gun control also exist (see Cook,
Ludwig and Samaha 2009 for a survey), but their the focus is not on diversion but on other type
of externalities, usually the impact of gun control on violent crime.
To be able to study crime empirically, we carried out a household level survey in rural Bangladesh.
Given the paucity of micro-level data on crime in developing countries, one contribution of our pa-
per is to document the prevalence and severity of crime. We ﬁnd that almost 40% of households
had suﬀered crime in the last 12 months. Relative to consumption levels, crime is also severe: The
average crime resulted in an economic loss worth two weeks' household consumption. To achieve
our objective of identifying the causal eﬀects of microcredit on cost of crime we do the following:
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We follow the seminal paper of Pitt and Khandker (1998) and the World Bank administered sur-
vey they utilized in data collection. Our questionnaire was otherwise identical to the World Bank
survey, but we used updated versions of the income questions and, in particular, we appended
questions on crime to the questionnaire. Following Pitt and Khandker, we utilize a landholdings-
based discontinuity in the microcredit organizations' decision rule to identify the causal eﬀect of
microcredit at the household level. We ﬁnd evidence that microcredit participation has a negative
causal (local average treatment) eﬀect on the cost of crime at the household level. While the exist-
ing literature has established that microcredit has a positive impact on diﬀerent outcomes such as
consumption, education, health and empowerement of women, the eﬀect of microcredit on cost of
crime has hitherto not been studied.
To study the question at the aggregate level,5 we develop a way to estimate externalities from
cross-section survey data on microcredit. To the best of our knowledge, our way of identifying
aggregate eﬀects (spillovers) is new to the literature.6 The idea behind our methodology is to
utilize the same discontinuity in the microcredit decision rule at the aggregate level as is used at
the household level. We ﬁnd that microcredit has a positive aggregate eﬀect on crime. That is,
crime at the village level is an increasing function of microcredit participation. As the household
level eﬀect is negative for participating households, our results indicate that microcredit generates
a diversion eﬀect towards non-participating households (and, possibly a scale eﬀect hitting these
same households), increasing their cost of crime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the following Section, we describe crime in rural
Bangladesh. Section 3 is devoted to our theoretical model. We discuss NGOs' role in Bangladesh
and our data collection in Section 4. We also present our data. The ﬁrst part of Section 5 is
devoted to the household level analysis, the second to the village level analysis. Section 6 provides
conclusions.
5Durlauf, Navarro and Rivers (2010) oﬀer a fresh discussion of aggregate crime regressions.
6The use of aggregate data to identify spillovers is not new, see e.g. Levy and Terleckyj (1983) who estimate the
eﬀects of R&D subsidies on R&D investment. Our solution to the endogeneity problem is new to our knowledge.
4
2 Crime and corruption in Bangladesh
2.1 Crime
It is well known that reliable data on crime is hard to come by, especially in developing countries.7
This notwithstanding, the consensus (see e.g. the UN report on Crime and Development in Africa
2005) seems to be that the levels of crime in developing countries is high, and hinders development.
In our survey (details of which are reported in section 4 and Aktaruzzaman 2009), we therefore
collected detailed information on the level and type of crime. These we report here.
In Bangladesh, most crime is perpetrated by local gangs. Most gangs are local, and concentrate
on extracting a living out of one or a few villages. Gangs have a lot of inﬂuence: For example,
Cameron (2009) reports that NGOs wishing to operate in the slums of Bangladesh cities have
to gain the permission of mastaans - leaders with links to criminal gangs, the police, and local
political parties.
Incidence of crime.8 In Table 1 we report the incidence of diﬀerent types of crime, also
conditioning on being a (non-)borrower. We asked each respondent whether his/her household had
been subject to crime of diﬀerent types during the previous 12 months. 36% of households were
subject to at least one type of crime; non-borrowers were aﬀected signiﬁcantly more often (42%
versus 23%). While most households that were victims of crime had experienced a single type of
crime, one third of those facing crime suﬀered at least two types of crime. It is more common for
non-borrowers to have suﬀered two or more types of crime (36% versus 21%). The most common
crime was the loss of household property (27%), followed by theft/extortion of money (13%) and
physical assault (6%). 4% of households lost some income due to having been assaulted by a
criminal gang. Non-borrowers suﬀered each type of crime more often, apart from loss of household
property. Looking at the frequency of crime, we ﬁnd that, conditional on being a subject of crime
at least once, households were subject to crime on average 1.4 times a year. Non-borrowers fare
worse than borrowers in every respect.
7Bangladesh joined the UN Crime Trends Survey as late as 2009.
8The statistics reported here are based on program villages where at least one microcredit organization is present.
Statistics using also non-program villages are very similar. We use weights that take our survey design into account.
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[Table 1 here]
Cost of crime. All these crimes had monetary consequences. For each type of crime, we asked
questions designed to measure the monetary consequences (see section 4.3 for more detail). To
put these costs into perspective, we divide them by the daily consumption (also measured in the
survey).9 In the ﬁrst row of panel A of Table 2 we report the cost of crime, summing over all diﬀerent
types of crime suﬀered by the household, and averaging over all households. The ﬁgures in panel
A can therefore be interpreted as the expected costs of crime over a year. The total cost of crime
is high, equalling on average 5 days' household consumption. Non-borrowers experience higher
costs of crime than borrowers: The average total cost of crime for borrowers and non-borrowers are
worth almost 2 and almost 8 days' consumption, with the diﬀerence being statistically signiﬁcant.
These ﬁgures however do not take into account that not every household suﬀers crime so we report
ﬁgures that condition on being a victim of crime in panel B. The total cost of crime equals almost
15 days' consumption, conditional on being a victim of crime. The ﬁgure is 8 days' consumption
for borrowers and 16 days' for non-borrowers. Finally, note that the variation (over households) is
high for essentially all measures of crime.
Looking at the composition of this, the Table shows that the expected medication costs are
relatively low compared to the expected costs of other types of crime. The crime having the highest
expected cost is the loss of household property, worth more than 4 days' consumption. Looking at
panel B, we ﬁnd that a similar pattern emerges when looking at costs conditional on being a crime
victim. Those losing household property suﬀer a loss worth more than 2 weeks' household average
consumption. While the means are higher for non-borrowers than borrowers, the diﬀerences aren't
statistically signiﬁcant, but for wage loss and total cost of crime.
9We measure consumption as the sum of expenditure on food, clothes and textiles, furniture, cosmetics, repair,
public transport, medical costs, recreation, gifts, dowry and legal expenses.
Our cost of crime may be underestimated because during the survey period it was realized that the perception
about crime is such that the villagers do not deﬁne an act as a criminal act if its severity is minimal. For example,
the following may not have been reported as crimes: Extortion for 50 taka, stealing chicken, fearing to go outside
at night. Households deﬁne an incidence as a criminal act only when its severity is large. However, in such cases
households' fear of the criminal gang prevents them from reporting the crimes. Therefore, we had to spend a lot of
time to get familiar with the interviewee before obtaining the information. It is thus possibile that our measure of
the cost of crime is downward biased.
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[Table 2 here]
Variation over villages. The level of crime varies considerably over villages. In Table 3 we
report village-level descriptive statistics on diﬀerent types of crime. The means diﬀer from those in
Table 1 as we here use weights that take village size into account. Panel A reports the incidence,
and panel B the cost of crime. The main interest is in between-village variation. The standard
deviation over villages of being the victim of at least one type of crime is 17% with a mean of 38%,
yielding a coeﬃcient of variation of 0.43; the standard deviation of wage loss is 5% (mean 2.7%),
that of medical expenses 5.6% (4%), that of lost property 11.4% (17.5%), and that of theft 5%
(mean 9%). Looking at the severity of crime conditional on being a victim, we ﬁnd larger variation.
Relative to daily household consumption, the standard deviation over villages' cost of crime from
wage loss is 1.5 (mean 2.1), medical expenses 2.4 (1.2), value of lost property 19 (17) and the sum
that was extorted 3.9 (2.3).
[Table 3 here]
Summary. Taken together, these statistics show that crime is wide-spread in (rural) Bangladesh,
aﬀecting a large proportion of households. Those households that are directly aﬀected suﬀer costs
that are large relative to consumption, but even the expected costs are high. Finally, there is large
variation both within and across villages both in the prevalence as well as the severity of crime
2.2 Corruption
Transparency International (TI) ranks Bangladesh 139th out of 180 countries (in 2009) using
its Corruption Perception Index. Transparency International Bangladesh (2005) reports that the
law enforcement agencies are the most corrupted sector in Bangladesh. According to the report,
that 92% of households who lodged a First Information Report (FIR) to the police station had to
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pay 2430 taka10 and 91% of households who registered at a General Dairy (GD) had to pay a bribe
worth 939 taka on average. 80% households who needed a clearance certiﬁcate from the police and
71% of those accused of a crime had to pay a bribes of 881 and 57 000 taka on average. Transparency
International (2010) places Bangladesh on the shared 7th place in the world in terms of corruption
of the police in its Global Corruption Barometer.11 The Bangladeshi newspaper The Daily Star
reports (based on TI 2010) that in addition to police (79%), civil servants (68%), political parties
(58%) and the judiciary (43%) are seen as the most corrupt sectors of the society.
There is also a huge police shortage in Bangladesh. Government data shows that there are 0.87
police per 1000 people  less than half compared with neighboring Sri Lanka.12Partly as a result
of this, the police was not able to execute more than 71% of the warrants in 2000 (UNDP, Human
Security in Bangladesh). Furthermore, the lower judicial sector in Bangladesh is as corrupt as the
Bangladesh police. For example, TIB (2005) ﬁnds that magistrates, attorneys, and court oﬃcials
demand bribes from defendants in more than 66% of the cases ﬁled under the Speedy Trial Act
(STA).
The above evidence of corruption and ineﬃciencies in the law enforcing agencies suggest that
property rights are relatively weak in Bangladesh, and poorly protected by oﬃcial institutions.
Weakly enforced property rights provoke local criminal gangs to operate with the help of village
leaders (matobbors) and local political leaders (The Bangladesh Observer 2004). One of the main
activities of gangs is household extortion. Any failure to pay leads to mental and physical assaults,
conﬁscation of goods, and/or kidnapping of children. The victims of these criminal gangs have to
surrender to the gang's demands because the victims know not only that the law enforcing insti-
tutions are not helpful, but also that the gangs are well connected with the village leaders. Weak
property rights such as those in Bangladesh lead to increased transaction costs, decreased commer-
cial certainty, and lower incentives for eﬃciency, and thereby decrease the welfare of households.
10One year 2009 U.S. dollar is worth 86 year 2006 taka using World Development Indicator data for Bangladeshi
inﬂation and the dollar-taka exchange rate. In 2005, the average monthly household income was 2560 taka in
Bangladesh (TIB, Household survey, 2005).
11Pakistan and 5 African countries have a higher score than Bangladesh.
12Sources: http://www.police.gov.bd/index5.php?category=18 (accessed October 8th 2010) and Seventh United
Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, covering the period 1998 - 2000
(United Nations Oﬃce on Drugs and Crime, Centre for International Crime Prevention); International Centre for
Prison Studies; Mr Lennox-Boyd's reports to the House of Commons.
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3 A model of microcredit and crime in a village economy
This section provides a simple model of the impact of microcredit on crime. After presenting
the model we simulate it to show the possibility of simultaneous negative eﬀects (decreasing cost
of crime) at the household level and positive eﬀects (increasing cost of crime) at the village level.
The core elements of the model are a) household decision on how to allocate labor between home
activities and laboring in other farms, b) household decision on how much resources to use to com-
bat crime, c) the gang decision on how to allocate criminal activities between households. The ﬁrst
feature is needed to model the impacts of microcredit on household behavior and the externalities
(positive or negative depending on the household type) associated with microcredit. The second
feature is needed to understand how microcredit aﬀects both the safeguard activities at the house-
hold level and the externalities this creates for other households. Cook (1986), Shavell (1991), de
Meza and Gould (1992) and Hotte and Ypersele (2008) argue that the improved safeguards used
by one household have a negative externality on other households as they become relatively easier
targets for criminals. As Shavell (1991) and Hotte and Ypersele (2008) show, this depends on pri-
vate property protection actions being publicly observable. Here this is the case, as the presence
of microcredit institution, its support to its clients and the clients identity are observable. The
third feature is needed to study both this externality and the overall impact of microcredit both at
the household and the village level. We focus on the behavior of a single gang, but our framework
can easily be generalized to a setting where several gangs exist. Our model is closest to Hotte and
Ypersele (2008). We diﬀer from them by studying the simultaneous eﬀects of two types of exter-
nalities: Those created by the microcredit program and those created by private protection against
crime. We study explicitly the allocation of criminal activity across households to understand the
diversion eﬀect. We also distinguish theoretically between the pure diversion eﬀect, (i.e., the eﬀect
at given aggregate level of eﬀort by the criminals) and the scale eﬀect (i.e., the level of criminal
activity and its allocation when criminals reallocate the activities between diﬀerent communities),
and focus on the implications of the pure diversion eﬀect, as it is theoretically more interesting.13
13Microcredit increases the incomes of the poor households and reduces incomes of the richer households. Both
eﬀects (see below) make the village more attractive to gangs to attack the village inducing it to spend more resources
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We simplify the analysis by studying the actions of only one criminal gang. This should not to be
crucial for our results as Hotte and Ypersele show that with a large number of gangs the negative
diversion externality from private property protection dominates the impacts of crime on aggregate
costs of crime on victims.
The diversion eﬀect can in itself imply that at the village level cost of crime increases if mi-
crocredit induces a diversion of criminal eﬀort towards richer households.14This requires that there
is some non-monotonicity in the rewards that the gang obtains from diﬀerent households. This
holds in our model: Richest households protect themselves so well that the potential income from
households has an inverted U-shape when plotted against the household landholdings. In our model
microcredit is, in line with microcredit organizations' own rules, directed only to those households
having small landholdings (below 0.5 acres). It has a negative externality on rich households through
the local labor market: Microcredit reduces the supply of labor to these markets increasing local
wage. Poor households, being net suppliers to this market, beneﬁt while richer households, being
net demanders of labor, lose.15
We proceed by ﬁrst modeling crime in the absence of microcredit, and then add microcredit to
the model. In doing this, we assume that microcredit creates an externality that is non-monotonic
in the land holdings of a household and model this externality in reduced form. We provide a
model for this externality in Appendix A. Finally, we show using numerical simulations that it is
possible that the eﬀect of microcredit on the cost of crime is negative at the household level (i.e., a
household obtaining microcredit has a lower cost of crime than it would had it not obtained credit),
while the eﬀect at the village level is positive (i.e., the cost of of crime increases at the aggregate
level).
on it. This just strengthens our case.
14In this section, by rich (poor) households we mean households with large (small) landholdings, i.e., not their
incomes. Richest (poorest) households are those with the largest (smallest) landholdings.
15 There exists evidence that microcredit generates consumption and income externalities at the village level.
Perhaps the most convincing evidence is presented in Khandker (2005) using panel data collected in Bangladesh.
Khandker does not present any evidence on the mechanisms creating the externalities. The village level aggregate
externality is positive, consistent with our model.
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3.1 Crime without microcredit
We analyze a two-stage game where households invest in protection from crime, and the criminal
gang decides how to allocate its eﬀort among heterogenous households. In the ﬁrst stage the
households invest in protection. This makes a proportion of their income unavailable to the gang.
In the second stage, the gang attacks the households. These attacks are costly to the gang.
We assume that the distribution of land in the village is given by the cdf F (a), with a denoting
the farm acreage. Let the income generated by a farm be y (a), with y′ (a) > 0, y” (a) ≤ 0.
Household land and y (a) are common knowledge. The total amount of eﬀort (or the number of
gang members) the gang devotes to the village is D. The gang decides on how to allocate this eﬀort
between the households.
To solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, we start from the second stage, where the
gang decides on how to allocate its eﬀort between households. Let d (a) denote the share of income
the gang steals from households owning a units of land. The decision problem of the gang is
max
∫ amax
0
d (a) (1− s (a)) y (a) dF (a)
s.t.∫ amax
0
c
2
d (a)
2
dF (a) = D.
s(a) denotes the share of income that is protected (through household investment) from the gang's
attack. This has been decided in the ﬁrst stage of the game. We assume that there is a household
speciﬁc cost to the gang from investing criminal eﬀort on the household. The cost is assumed to be
quadratic and hence convex.
The problem is isoperimetric giving
(1− s (a)) y (a)− λcd (a) = 0
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as the ﬁrst order condition where λ = the shadow price of gang's resources. This yields
d (a) =
(1− s (a)) y (a)
λc
. (1)
The shadow price is given by
λ2 =
∫ amax
0
[(1− s (a)) y (a)]2 dF (a)
2cD
. (2)
With the given speciﬁcation of the cost function, the gang attacks all households, but the intensity
varies across households.
Next we turn to the households' problem, i.e., the ﬁrst stage of the game. When analyzing
the household optimization problem we assume that the households are "small", i.e., they take the
shadow price of the gang as given and do not think they can alone have an eﬀect on it. In more
concrete language, the households take the village level threat of the gang as given. Instead the
households understand that they can have an eﬀect on how the gang allocates its resources within
the village. Assume that household welfare if it chooses to protect share s of its income is
[(1− d (a)) (1− s) + s] y (a)− v
2
s2
where v2s
2 = cost of protection to the household. The household maximizes this subject to (1).
The optimal level of protective eﬀort is given by
s (a) =
2y (a)
2
λvc+ 2y (a)
2 . (3)
Obviously s′ (a) > 0. Also since
1− s (a) = λvc
λvc+ 2y (a)
2 ,
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(note that this is increasing in λ) we get
[1− s (a)] y (a) = λvcy (a)
λvc+ 2y (a)
2 . (4)
Equation (4) gives the attractiveness of the household to the gang (the L.H.S.). This also
determines how much eﬀort the gang invests in attacking the household. We diﬀerentiate (4) with
respect to income to get
∂ [1− s (a)] y (a)
∂y (a)
≷ 0⇔ (5)
y (a) ≶
(
λvc
2
) 1
2
.
Thus, the relationship between household income and its attractiveness as a target to the gang is
non-monotonic: The richest households protect their incomes so eﬃciently that the gang spends
eﬀort on them by the same amount as on some relatively poorer households. The "middle-class"
faces the most serious threat of crime, even though the poorer a family, the less it protects itself.
The reason for this is that the value of a given amount of criminal eﬀort directed towards a poorer
family is lower, than its value when directed towards a richer family.
In this framework the theoretical equivalent to the concept of "cost of crime" used in the
empirical work is the following:
cc (a) = d(a) [1− s (a)] y (a) + v
2
s2 (6)
Using (3) and (4) this becomes
cc (a) = [
λvcy (a)
λvc+ 2y (a)
2 +
v
2
(
2y (a)
2
λvc+ 2y (a)
2
)2
]
vy(a)
[λvc+ 2y(a)2]λc
. (7)
The (subgame perfect equilibrium) solution for the village level threat λ is the solution to (obtained
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by inserting (4) into (2)):
λ2 =
∫ amax
0
[
λvcy(a)
λvc+2y(a)2
]2
dF (a)
2cD
(8)
Because the L.H.S. is a convex function of λ with derivative 0 at 0 and the R.H.S. is a concave
function of λ with positive derivative at 0, there exists a unique solution to the equation. For
empirics (8) implies that the village level of threat depends on land distribution and distribution
of income.
3.2 Crime with microcredit
Assume now that among poor households who are eligible for credit (those with less than half
an acre of land, a < 12 ), a share m (a) receive microcredit. We assume that having microcredit
reduces the marginal cost of protection:
vmcB < v.
We also assume that microcredit has a direct eﬀect on those households receiving the credit (note
that the eﬀect is conditional on household land):
y (a,mcB) ≥ y (a) .
We also assume microcredit to have an externality on other households. To motivate both the
direct eﬀect of microcredit on a household and the externality, we provide in Appendix A a model
of household production and village-internal labor markets. In that model, poor households (those
with small land-holdings) are supplying labor whereas rich households (with large landholdings) are
on the demand side. We show that introducing microcredit which is allocated to some proportion
of poor households increases the equilibrium wage, beneﬁting poor households, but imposing a cost
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on rich households. Here, we model the externality in reduced form:
y (a,mcNB) ≷ y (a) .
Again in line with the labor market model, we assume that
y (a,mcB) ≥ y (a,mcNB) . (9)
Even with this formulation, the maximization problem of the gangs is isoperimetric and the La-
grangian (Hamiltonian) of the gang is
H =
∫ 1
2
0
[
dmcB (a) (1− smcB (a)) y (a,mcB) + λ
(
D − c
2
d (a)
2
dF (a)
)]
m (a) dF (a) +∫ 1
2
0
[
d (a) (1− s (a)) y (a,mcNB) + λ
(
D − c
2
d (a)
2
dF (a)
)]
(1−m (a)) dF (a) +∫ amax
1
2
[
d (a) (1− s (a)) y (a,mcNB) + λ
(
D − c
2
d (a)
2
dF (a)
)]
dF (a) .
We take into account that the gang allocates a diﬀerent amount of eﬀort (dmcB) to households who
have microcredit and that these households invest a diﬀerent amount in protection (smcB). For
each group of households, the solution is of the same type as above, (1).
The household decisions also have the same form as above in (3). For households receiving
microcredit the solution is
smcB (a) =
2y (a,mcB)
2
λvmcBc+ 2y (a,mcB)
2 .
Thus, microcredit improves the security of borrowers through two direct channels, by reducing the
costs of protection and by increasing their incomes.
What counts for the gang is the income available for robbing. For borrowers this is given by
(analogously to (4)):
[1− smcB (a)] y (a,mcB) = λvmcBcy (a,mcB)
λvmcBc+ 2y (a,mcB)
2
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To understand the eﬀect that microcredit has on the cost of crime of diﬀerent households, it is
useful to start from non-borrowing households. The richest households will experience a decrease in
their income through the negative microcredit-induced (wage) externality. They hence become less
attractive targets for the gang, even after taking into account the reduction in their crime-prevention
eﬀort. The poorest non-borrower households, on the other hand, experience an increase in their
income through the positive microcredit-induced (wage) externality, and become more attractive
targets for the gang. Hence, for the richest (poorest) non-borrower households, the introduction of
microcredit leads a decrease (increase) in the cost of crime. For the middle-income non-borrower
households, the net eﬀect depends, and can go either way.
Moving then to borrowers, who all are poor given our assumption on how microcredit is allocated,
the following holds: On the one hand, microcredit makes the poorest borrowing households more
attractive targets both through the direct as well as the externality-induced income eﬀect. On the
other hand, microcredit reduces their cost of preventing crime. The total eﬀect hence depends,
and can go either way. For the (less) poor borrower households, the relative increase in income is
smaller (as they sell less of their labor) and hence for them, the cost-reduction eﬀect of microcredit
may dominate. Hence, for the least poor borrower households, the eﬀect is unambiguous: The
introduction of microcredit leads to a reduction in the cost of crime. The model thus suggests that
the introduction of microcredit aﬀects the cost of crime of all households; the eﬀect is unambiguous
only for the richest and poorest non-borrowers, and the least poor borrowers. The size and sign of
the average household treatment eﬀect therefore depends, and is a function both of the eﬀect on
the treated (borrowers) as well as on the control group (non-borrowers).
How does microcredit aﬀect the village level intensity of threat? It can be solved, using steps
analogous to those above, from
λ2 =
1
2cD
×
∫ 1
2
0
[
λvMCcy(a,mcB)
λvMCc+2y(a,mcB)
2
]2
m (a) dF (a)+∫ 1
2
0
[
λvcy(a,mcNB)
λvc+2y(a,mcNB)2
]2
(1−m (a)) dF (a)+∫ A
1
2
[
λvcy(a,mcNB)
λvc+2y(a,mcNB)2
]2
dF (a)

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This can, ceteris paribus, go either way. If the "weighted aggregate exploitable income" of the
village increases because of the credit (the R.H.S. of the previous equation increases for any given
λ), then crime intensity increases, i.e., the equilibrium λ increases.
3.3 Simulation results
Here we show that microcredit can increase the costs of crime at the village level even though
it improves the situation (=reduces the cost of crime) of the households obtaining the credit. To
begin with, we use the following density for the land distribution
f(a) =
β
ς + χa
.
This we have (roughly) calibrated to the average village data in our data. The productivity eﬀect
of microcredit is assumed to be 5 per cent, i.e.,
µ = 0.05.
We assume the cost of protection for borrowers to be just modestly lower than for other non-
borrowers. This is just to make sure that our results do not hinge on extremely large crime
externalities created by the microcredit. We also want to give a small cost advantage to gangs
in their activities over the households in their protection activities16. Thus we set
ν = 1.51
vMC = 1.47.
For simplicity we have set
A = 1
16Keeping the other parameters the same but setting v = c = 1.5 still gives negative impacts on non-borrowers
but the aggregate impact is positive.
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and
α = 0.5, l = 5, c = 1.5, D = 0.5.
The share of poor households receiving credit is estimated by ﬁtting a polynomial to the average
data from program villages and normalizing the aggregate share to unity (i.e., ignoring the fact
that some formally ineligible households have received credit).
The ﬁrst result is that microcredit reduces the average cost of crime for the borrowers by a small
amount: Their cost of crime is 0.2019 without credit, 0.2016 with credit. Not all borrowers beneﬁt
as can be seen in Figure 1. The non-borrowers' cost of crime increases. The cost of crime of the
eligible non-borrowers increases from 0.0770 to 0.0772 while the cost of crime for the households
with more than 0.5 acre land increase from 0.0929 to 0.0931. The cost of crime of the eligible non-
borrowers are without microcredit smaller than the cost of borrowers as with our ﬁtted borrower
share function the share of borrowers among the wealthier households (below the 0.5 threshold) is
relatively large. These ﬁgures are population share weighted ﬁgures, (explaining the small ﬁgure for
large landowners) so that by adding them one can see that the aggregate costs of crime increases
when microcredit is introduced to the village. The relatively large numbers for the borrowers are
due to the relatively large share of borrowers with large land holdings (even though below 0.5 acres).
In the simulated model it is the poorest and richest non-borrowers that are especially hurt by crime
(as measured by the change in the level of cost of crime), though most non-borrowers are hurt. Even
among the poor the gain by borrowers is outweighed by the loss of non-borrowers. Interestingly,
also the poorest borrowers face higher costs of crime.
[Figure 1 here]
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4 Data
4.1 NGOs in Bangladesh
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have expanded signiﬁcantly their activities in Bangladesh,
with an estimated 750 NGOs now present. Most of them are small, and have limited managerial
and staﬀ capacity. For instance, 90 percent of those NGOs have programs in less than ﬁve out
of the 64 districts of Bangladesh. NGOs in Bangladesh provide a strikingly homogeneous set of
services like health-care and sanitation, child education with microcredit dominating. Microcredit
now reaches almost 43% of households and covers about 70% of rural poor in Bangladesh. This sec-
tor is dominated by the Grameen Bank, BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee), and
ASA (Association for Social Advancement), which collectively cover about 81% of the microcredit
market in Bangladesh (see Figure 2). Therefore, we considered only these three credit programs in
our survey.
[Figure 2 here]
All microcredit organizations use the same land-holding - based rule on allocation of credit:
Households who own more than one half an acre of land are ineligible for credit. As will become
clear below, our data is similar to the BIDS-World Bank survey data collected in 1998 in that this
rule is not strictly enforced.
4.2 Data collection
During the period of 2006-2007, a household survey was conducted in 69 Bangladeshi villages
using a multi-stage stratiﬁed random sampling technique. In the ﬁrst stage, 487 police stations17 of
Bangladesh were divided into ﬁve strata according to presence of diﬀerent microcredit organizations:
17Police stations also serve as local judicial units and deﬁne geographical areas.
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Grameen Bank, BRAC, ASA, mixed program and non-program strata.18 We randomly selected 4
police stations from Grameen Bank, and BRAC strata, and 5 police stations from the remaining
three strata. In this way, we chose 23 randomly police stations.
From each police station, we randomly selected three villages for the survey. A census was
conducted in each of the selected villages. The purpose of the census was to identify eligible (less
than 50 decimals, i.e., half an acre, of land) and ineligible (50 or more decimals of land) house-
holds for microcredit, as well as participating and non-participating households among the eligible
ones in the program villages. In the non-program villages a random sampling technique was used
to draw 15 eligible and 7 ineligible households. Using our census data, we categorized the village
households into program participants, eligible non-participants, and ineligible non-participants. We
drew 15 households randomly from the program participant and 5 households from the eligible non-
participant category. 2 ineligible households were also drawn randomly. Overall, 1 518 households
were drawn for the survey, of which 810 (53.2%) were program participants and 708 (46.8%) were
non-participants. 1188 of the households were in the program villages. These households consti-
tute our household level sample. In producing our household level descriptive statistics, we use
weights to correct for the within-village sampling scheme. For village level descriptive statistics and
estimations, we use weights that also take into account the variation in village size.
To formulate our own questionnaire we followed the BIDS-World Bank (1998) household survey
questionnaire to which we included crime related questions. Our survey is described in detail in
Aktaruzzaman (2009).
4.3 Measurement of cost of crime
Our measure of cost of crime includes wage loss due to crime, medication cost for injuries
suﬀered in a gang attack, price of conﬁscated household goods, and the value of cash payments to
the gang. We deﬁne the wage lost by the cost that a household has to bear because of inability
to sell labor after being injured in an attack by a gang. To calculate the wage loss, we asked the
victims `how much could you have earned per day (on average) during those days when you were
18A large number of other microcredit organizations were present in these villages. As explained above, their
market shares are very small however.
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unable to work because of injury due to gang attack?' To compute medication costs, we include
all the expenses regarding medication, such as doctor fees, government hospital/ health center or
private clinic bills and cost of medicine. To ﬁnd out the price of stolen household goods we asked the
following question: `Have any household members been evicted or have any household goods been
stolen by the gang during the last 12 months?' We considered more than 17 categories household
items, such as goats, chicken, crops, and bicycles. If the answer to this question was `yes' we asked
`how many times has the incidence occurred and what is the estimated value of the stolen goods?'.
We also include the amount of money given by a household directly to a gang member or to
someone who negotiated with the gang. To estimate the cash payments we asked `have you or any
members of your household given any money to the gang in the last 12 months?' If the answer was
yes, we than asked how many times the household gave money to the gang and the amount each
time. We asked similar questions to measure the negotiation costs with gang.19
4.4 Descriptive statistics of household characteristics
At the household level, we collected data on a number of household characteristics and, critically,
on household land. Regarding land, we not only collected information on the amount of land, but
also an estimate of its value per acre. Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of these. The average
age of the household head is 44 years old (s.d. 12), average land-holding is 0.8 acres (s.d. 1.6),
value of land per acre is on average 10 600 taka and average consumption is 57 000 taka per year.
More than 60% of households have less than half an acre of land (the threshold for microcredit);
almost all household heads are male;20and 85% of households are Muslim.
Some of the household characteristics are statistically diﬀerent for borrowers and non-borrowers.
Borrowers own less land on average (0.24 as opposed to 1.10 acres) and are also more likely to be
landless (17% versus 13%); they are slightly less educated (3.4 compared to 4.6 years for the
household head); are younger (41 compared to 44 years old); their home is a dwelling more often
(90% compared to 75%); they are located further from the entry point to the village (730 meters
19When households are threatened by extortion, they often seek help from a person who is well connected to gang.
This is done in order to negotiate with the gang. Some cost is involved to complete this procedure, and this cost we
call the negotiation cost.
20A woman is the household head essentially only if she is a widow.
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instead of 590) and also further from the village center (403 as opposed to 335 meters); are much
more often eligible for credit, i.e., own less than half an acre of land (88% versus 49%); and their
household annual consumption is lower (52 000 taka compared to 59 000). In addition to the ﬁgures
reported in the Table 4, we calculated the probability of obtaining credit conditional on being
eligible. The probability of obtaining credit is 33% for eligible, and 7% for ineligible households.
[Table 4 here]
As with crime, there is considerable heterogeneity between villages in some household charac-
teristics. Looking at village level statistics in presented in Table 5,21 we ﬁnd that the standard
deviation of village-level average household land is 0.66 when the mean is 0.87. When looking at
average village level consumption (standard deviation of means 13 000 taka, mean 51 000), average
education of household head (s.d. 1.9 years, mean 4.3 years), the proportion of land-less households
(s.d. 0.1, mean 0.17) or land value / acre (s.d. 9800 taka, mean 11 000 taka), we again ﬁnd con-
siderable heterogeneity. Heterogeneity across villages in family size (s.d. 0.6., mean 4.8) and age of
household head (s.d. 4.6 mean 44) is much smaller.
[Table 5 here]
4.5 Veriﬁcation of the RD design
In the language of the regression discontinuity literature, our forcing variable is the amount
of land a household owns. The critical threshold is 0.5 acres (see Section 4.1). We now analyze
whether this threshold satisﬁes the criteria of the RD design (RDD).
A crucial issue is manipulation of the threshold. Imagine that, contrary to what is the case, the
microcredit organizations strictly enforced the 0.5 acre rule. Then households with landholdings
21As in Section 2, due to the small number of villages surveyed, we include non-program villages into the village
level statistics.
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just exceeding the critical 0.5 acre value would have an incentive to sell a small part of their land in
order to become eligible. Figure 3 shows a histogram of the proportion of households with diﬀerent
landholdings, conditional on the village being a program village. The Figure clearly shows that
while program and non-program villages seem to have a very diﬀerent distribution of land-holdings,
the program villages also have a suspiciously high proportion of households just below the 0.5 acre
threshold. This could be the outcome of households selling enough land to get under the threshold
in order to become eligible (to increase the probability of getting credit).
[Figure 3 here]
We ﬁrst tested for the eﬀect of the threshold.22 The probability of obtaining credit is 0.33 for
program village households under the threshold, and 0.07 for households over the thresholds. Thus,
in line with the World Bank survey data, our data reveals that microcredit organizations do not
enforce their announced eligibility policy. The diﬀerence in the probability of obtaining credit is
highly signiﬁcant however (p-value 0.000). Thus the data suggests that there is an incentive to
manipulate the threshold.
To check whether manipulation has really taken place, we resorted to two approaches. Unchar-
acteristically for data used in an RDD setting, we have a control group of non-program villages.
In those villages, there is no need to manipulate the threshold. To utilize them to test for ma-
nipulation, we did the following: First, we divided land-ownership into B = 11 bins.23 Second,
we calculated the proportion of households in each village belonging to each of the bins. This
resulted in B observations of the variable propbi , the proportion of households in bin b in village
i per village. We then regressed propbi on B − 1 bin dummies, and interactions between the B
bin dummies and a program - village indicator. The results suggest that while the proportion of
households in the bin just below the threshold is higher than the proportion of households in the
bin just above the threshold, the diﬀerence in this between program and non-program villages is
not statistically signiﬁcant: The p-value of a Wald-test is 0.13. An interpretation of this result is
22Of course, the real test of the threshold is the signiﬁcance of the eligibility dummy in our ﬁrst stage regression.
It is highly signiﬁcant at 1% level.
23We constructed the bins by 10 decimals, i.e., 0.1 acres of land.
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that around the threshold, the distribution of households is not statistically diﬀerent between the
program and non-program villages, suggesting that no (large scale) manipulation has taken place.
As a second test, we looked at the value of land of households just above and just below the
threshold in program villages. The idea behind this test is that (given some imperfections in the
market for land in rural Bangladesh), a household that originally owned more than 0.5 acres of
land would sell its marginal and thus least valuable land to get under the threshold. An implication
of this would be that the land value (per acre) of households just below the threshold should be
higher than that of households just above the threshold. The raw data does not support this, as
the land value per acre just below the threshold in the program villages is 7331 taka, and just above
9489 taka. To perform a more formal test, we ran a regression where the dependent variable was
landvaluebik, the value of land (per acre) of household k in village i and bin b, where bins were
determined according to amount of land owned by the household. The explanatory variables were
bin dummies and interactions between them and a program village indicator. We then tested for
the signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of the bin-dummies just above and just below
the threshold. The coeﬃcient for program villages is, in line with the raw data, negative with a
p-value of 0.68. The result is robust to alternative ways of constructing the bins.
5 Estimation and results
5.1 Household level analysis
Our main household level analysis utilizes data on program village households. Given the
relatively small number of households, we resort to a parametric fuzzy regression discontinuity (as
in e.g. van der Klaauw 2002) and employ polynomials of the (scaled) forcing variable (land). Our
instrument is the indicator variable for eligibility that takes value 1 if the household owns at most
0.5 acres of land and is zero otherwise. As is well known, this set-up amounts to 2SLS estimation.
Our theoretical model strongly suggests heterogenous eﬀects, in which case we identify the local
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average treatment eﬀect of microcredit on crime. Following Lee and Lemieux's (2010) suggestion,
we estimate the model using polynomials of diﬀerent powers, always including interactions between
the instrument and the polynomial terms.24
The estimation equation takes the form:
CCik = Xikβ + δDik + g(landik) + ik, (10)
where CCik is (the log of) our measure of the cost of crime faced by household i in village k,
Xik is a possible vector of covariates (village ﬁxed eﬀects and household characteristics), Dik is
the indicator variable for obtaining microcredit or alternatively, the (log of the) amount of credit,
landik is the amount of land owned by household i, ik is the error term, g(.) a (polynomial) function
to be speciﬁed, and (β, and especially) δ the coeﬃcient(s) of interest. We only use observations
(households) from the program villages.
We include in the reported speciﬁcations household characteristics and village ﬁxed eﬀects for
eﬃciency reasons,25 but our results are robust to excluding (either or both of) them. Our vector of
household characteristics is the following: A dummy for religion (Muslim vs. non-Muslim), years
of schooling of the household head, a dummy for the gender of the household head, a dummy
for dwelling type, number of adult male members, distance to the nearest neighboring household,
distance to the entry point to the village, distance from the center of the village. We follow a
general to speciﬁc testing procedure and start with a 4th order polynomial.
5.1.1 First stage results
We report our ﬁrst stage results in Table 5. In column one we include no control function terms,
and the eligibility dummy obtains a positive and highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient, with a t-value of over
8. Both household characteristics and village ﬁxed eﬀects are as groups each jointly signiﬁcant in
all speciﬁcations. In column two we add a ﬁrst order polynomial in scaled land. The coeﬃcient of
24We scale land so that it takes value zero at the threshold. This is done in order for our model to satisfy
the fundamental assumption behind regression discontinuity (See Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw 2001). We
orthonormalize the polynomial terms and the interactions between the eligibility dummy and the polynomial terms.
25This is in line with Hoxby (2000) who argues that in a situation where the number of observations close to
threshold is limited, a within RDD approach is more powerful and less biased.
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the eligibility dummy is still signiﬁcant with a t-statistic of almost 8. Scaled land and its interaction
with the eligibility dummy are jointly signiﬁcant. In the third column we add a second order term
and its interaction. Now the t-statistic of the eligibility dummy is almost 7. The second order
terms, and all polynomial terms are jointly signiﬁcant. Adding third order terms in column 4 gives
otherwise a similar picture (t-statistic of the eligibility dummy 5), but the third order terms are
not jointly signiﬁcant. Column 5 repeats this, with a t-statistic of 4 for the eligibility dummy, and
jointly insigniﬁcant fourth order terms.
Testing the restricted models against our most general speciﬁcation, we cannot reject the Null
that 4th order terms are jointly insigniﬁcant, nor the Null that 4th and 3rd order terms are jointly
insigniﬁcant. The 2nd - 4th order terms are however jointly signiﬁcant at the 6% level, suggesting we
reject the 1st stage speciﬁcation against the general model. The same applies to the most restricted
model without any control function terms. Testing the restricted versions against each other we
cannot reject the Null that 3rd order terms are jointly insigniﬁcant, but do reject the Null that 2nd
order terms are jointly insigniﬁcant.
We conclude from these ﬁrst stage results that a second order polynomial is suﬃcient for the
ﬁrst stage speciﬁcation. Our instrument, the eligibility dummy, is however strong even if we use
higher order polynomials.
5.1.2 Second stage results
The ﬁrst issue we have to confront regarding the second stage speciﬁcation is the order of the
polynomial. We have done the following: We ﬁrst use a 4th order polynomial in the ﬁrst stage and
perform general to speciﬁc testing of the second stage polynomial. What we ﬁnd is that we cannot
reject the most restricted speciﬁcation (i.e., the one without any control function terms) against
the more general alternatives. Second, we use the same polynomial in both the ﬁrst and the second
stages. It is these latter results that we report here.
We report the results in Tables 6 and 7 and concentrate on the coeﬃcient of the treatment
variable. In Table 6 the treatment variable is an indicator variable for the household having a
microcredit loan; in Table 7 the log of the loan size, measured in taka (=log(1+taka)). We report
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results from estimations that always include household characteristics and a full set of village ﬁxed
eﬀects.26
[Table 6 here]
In column one of Table 6 where we don't include any control function terms our estimate of
the treatment eﬀect is -3.7 and statistically signiﬁcant at better than 1% level. Adding 1st order
terms does not change the estimate, nor the signiﬁcance level, much. The control function terms
are jointly insigniﬁcant. Adding 2nd order variables changes the picture. The coeﬃcient of the
treatment variable decreases in absolute value and is very imprecisely measured. However, both
the 2nd order terms, and all control function terms are jointly insigniﬁcant. Adding 3rd order terms
in column four brings no change to the results of column three: The estimated treatment eﬀect is
again highly insigniﬁcant, as are both the 3rd order and all the control function terms. In column
ﬁve we report results from using a 4th order polynomial in both the ﬁrst and the second stages. The
estimated treatment eﬀect is now -1.24 and very imprecisely measured. However, again the added
4th order polynomial terms are jointly insigniﬁcant, as are all the control function terms. The tests
reported in the Table suggest that we should either not use any control function terms, or at most
a ﬁrst order polynomial, in the second stage speciﬁcation.
Our speciﬁcation tests suggest using a 2nd order polynomial in the ﬁrst stage, and either no
control function terms, or a 1st order polynomial in the second stage. When we do that, we obtain
a treatment eﬀect of -3.98 (-4.02) when using no control function terms (a 1st order polynomial)
in the second stage, with a t-value of 3.05 (2.67). The joint signiﬁcance levels of the polynomial
terms, village ﬁxed eﬀects and household characteristics are similar to those reported in Table 6 for
the corresponding second order speciﬁcations.
Taken together, these results provide some support for a negative causal eﬀect of obtaining
microcredit on the cost of crime. These results are tempered by the fact that the point estimate
of the treatment eﬀect is reduced in absolute value, and loses signiﬁcance, when we move to use
26Our results are robust to excluding either of or both of these.
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higher order polynomials. The interpretation of there being a (signiﬁcant) negative causal eﬀect
gets however support from our testing procedure on what order polynomial to use. Thus, our
interpretation is that the preferred speciﬁcation is the one using a 2nd order polynomial in the ﬁrst
stage, and either no control function terms, or a 1st order polynomial in the second stage. Both
speciﬁcations yield a negative and statistically signiﬁcant causal eﬀect of microcredit on the cost of
crime.
As robustness tests, we have done four things: First, we have estimated the model using a
4th order polynomial in the ﬁrst stage: Our results are essentially unchanged. Second, we re-
estimated all the above models using data from all villages, i.e., by including the non-program
village households into the estimation sample. The results are in line with those reported: The
coeﬃcients of the treatment variable are somewhat smaller in absolute terms, but their statistical
signiﬁcance is higher. Third, we have estimated the model without either or both the village ﬁxed
eﬀects and household characteristics. Our results are robust to excluding them. Finally, we have
used the estimation approach of Pitt and Khandker (1998; see Pitt 1999) which utilizes data on
both treatment and non-program villages,27 has two ﬁxed eﬀects per village, and imposes some
constraints on the data. The results are in line with those reported in that we ﬁnd a negative and
a statistically signiﬁcant treatment eﬀect.
[Table 7 here]
Moving to Table 7 where the treatment variable is continuous, we ﬁnd that our results regard-
ing the order of the polynomial when using the credit indicator carry over to using a continuous
treatment variable: The data suggests to either not use any control function terms, or to only use a
1st order polynomial in the second stage, and to use a 2nd order polynomial in the ﬁrst stage. The
biggest change on the testing front is that household characteristics become jointly insigniﬁcant in
the second stage when we use a 4th order polynomial. The point estimate of the treatment variable
is always negative, varies between 0.13 and 0.40 in absolute value, and is statistically signiﬁcant
27We follow Pitt and Khandker also in not including polynomials of (scaled) land, nor interactions with the
eligibility dummy.
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when we do not include control function terms, and when using a 1st order polynomial (in the
second stage). Concentrating on these two estimates, we ﬁnd an elasticity of -0.4.
5.2 Village level analysis
The household level analysis leaves open the question of whether the estimated negative treat-
ment eﬀect of microcredit on cost of crime is due to the cost of borrower households' decreasing or
due to the cost of crime of non-borrower households increasing, or both. Figure 4 below plots the
cost of crime of borrowers, non-borrowers in program villages, and households in the non-program
villages that by deﬁnition are all non-borrowers, as a function of land holdings. As is clear from the
Figure, the cost of crime of borrowers is lower but the cost of crime of program village non-borrowers
is higher than that of non-program village households. The mean cost of crime for non-borrower
households in program villages is 1600 taka while it is 800 taka in the non-program villages. A
t-test suggests though that the diﬀerence between the non-borrowers in program and non-program
villages is not signiﬁcant when measured in absolute or in relative terms. Nonetheless, the Figure
suggests that the estimated negative treatment eﬀect may be due to negative spillovers from micro-
credit to non-borrowing households, i.e., due to the diversion eﬀect of the criminal gang reallocating
its activities towards non-borrower households.
[Figure 4 here]
To identify the eﬀect of microcredit on village level crime, we exploit two sources of variation:
First, we use the variation across villages in the proportion of households that are microcredit
customers. As the proportion of households that are microcredit customers is potentially linked to
unobservables that also aﬀect village level crime (e.g. location of the village, fertility of the soil
etc.), we need an instrument. The second source of variation that we exploit yields our instrument:
We use the proportion of households that are eligible for microcredit, i.e., own at most 0.5 acres of
land. Our identiﬁcation assumption is thus that, conditional on covariates (which include controls
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for land ownership and its distribution), the proportion of households with at most 0.5 acres of land
does not aﬀect the level of village level crime.
While both the average amount of land owned by households, its value per acre, and the distri-
bution of land-ownership all are potentially correlated with the level of crime, it seems unlikely that
our instrument is. The reason we think this is the case is that the 0.5 acre threshold is essentially
arbitrary and should have no eﬀect on the propensity of a household becoming the target of a crim-
inal gang. To control for the level and distribution of land ownership, we include the mean amount
of land owned by households in village i and its square, as well as the proportion of households
with no land. The latter is potentially important as there is signiﬁcant variation over villages in
the proportion of landless households, and presumably they are unattractive targets of crime.
Our estimation sample consists of the 54 program villages included in our survey, and we thus
have to work with a very small sample. It is well known that 2SLS suﬀers potentially from small
sample problems. There is little we can do about this, and the results therefore have to be inter-
preted with some caution. Our model is just identiﬁed, and therefore the alternative strategy of
estimating the reduced from of the model does not work. Instead, we have estimated the model
with diﬀerent transformations of both the endogenous explanatory variables. Because of the small
sample size, we include only a limited set of control variables in addition to the land-based variables.
These are: Highest grade of education completed by the household head; dwelling type; the number
of adult male household members; distance to the nearest neighbor; and distance to the entry point
to the village. All are measured as village-level averages. We report bootstrapped standard errors.
Our dependent variable is the log of the cost of crime for the average household in the village (i.e.,
we take the average of the cost of crime over all households in the village).
[Table 8 here]
Table 8 contains the results of our estimations. Our instrument works ﬁne, with 1st stage F-tests
well in excess of the rule of thumb - value of 10. No matter whether we use the levels or logs of
the endogenous explanatory variable, we ﬁnd that at the village level, an increase in the proportion
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of borrower households has a positive causal eﬀect on the level of crime. Results in column two
suggest that the elasticity of crime at the village level is rather high at 1.2 - this contrasts with the
estimated household level elasticity (on the amount borrowed) of -0.4. Additionally we ﬁnd that of
our controls, only land obtains a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient. In line with expectations, the coeﬃcient is
positive, indicating that richer villages face more crime. As a (limited) way of dealing with the small
sample size we also estimated the reduced form of the village level model. There, the coeﬃcient of
our instrument is 6.2, and signiﬁcant at 3% level.
These results suggest that while the causal (local average treatment) eﬀect of microcredit on
the cost of crime at the micro level is negative, it is positive at the macro level. This suggests
that microcredit creates a crime externality: It may attract more crime to the village, and certainly
diverts crime to other households. This then hits non-borrowing households (and, potentially, those
borrower-households not at the threshold) more, as the participating households (aﬀected by the
treatment at the threshold) are better able to protect them, due to e.g. the group-mechanisms of
microcredit. It is also plausible that the joint liability mechanism of microcredit plays an important
role here, forcing households to internalize the costs of crime of other households in the same
borrower group.
6 Conclusions
Crime is facilitated by weak and/or corrupt oﬃcial institutions. The unfortunate situation is
that many developing countries' institutions are both weak and corrupt. These circumstances may
give rise to unoﬃcial institutions that seek to improve the situation. Microcredit has traditionally
been seen as an endogenously arisen institutional remedy to the imperfections of the oﬃcial
ﬁnancial structures. As a byproduct, it may however provide more than just that, aﬀecting other
areas of life, too. The objective of this paper was to study the eﬀect of microcredit on crime.
Our survey documents the high frequency and the severe economic consequences of crime in
rural Bangladesh. Some 30% of households were victims of some type of crime in the last 12
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months that had economic consequences. The consequences, relative to consumption, were severe:
Typically, a household would suﬀer losses worth several days' household consumption. We believe
this to be important, and alarming, new information. Microcredit borrowers face less crime than
non-borrowers.
The theoretical model we use allows us to study the capacity allocation decision of a crime
gang, the investments in protection by households, and the household (micro) and village (macro)
eﬀects of crime. We model microcredit as having two eﬀects: First, it increases household income
for poor households, possibly also of non-borrowing households through a labor-market externality
(an example is that non-borrower households are employed by borrower households in their new
micro enterprises), but decreases the income of rich (non-borrower) households through the same
externality. Second, it reduces the cost of investing in protection against crime. The key insight we
take from the model is that one of the many possible outcomes is one where the eﬀect of microcredit
on cost of crime is diﬀerent at the micro and macro levels. In particular, it is possible that the
eﬀect at the household level is that the cost of crime decreases (on average) for borrower households,
while at the village level crime increases through the diversion eﬀect alone.
We employ a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal eﬀect of microcredit on cost
of crime at the household level. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect. Employing a continuous
measure of microcredit participation, we ﬁnd an elasticity of -0.4. While our household level result
is not robust to using higher order polynomials, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of using low
order polynomials. The results hold in the robustness tests we perform.
We then extend the identiﬁcation used in regression discontinuity design to the village level. To
the best of our knowledge, this is a new way of solving the endogeneity problem, thereby allowing us
to identify spillovers from aggregate data. Its beneﬁt is that one can use it with cross-section data;
its cost, at least in our case, is that the number of villages (and hence the number of observations) in
our survey is rather small. We ﬁnd that at the macro level, microcredit increases the cost of crime.
The estimated elasticity of village level cost of crime with respect to the proportion of microcredit
borrowers is 1.4.
Putting together our micro (household) and macro (village) level results suggests the following:
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First, the various microcredit mechanisms - eﬀorts to increase the citizenship of participants, reg-
ular sharing of information, and the joint liability mechanisms that forces participating households
to internalize negative shocks of other participating households - mitigate crime among microcredit
borrowers. Second, microcredit creates a crime externality on the non-participating households,
diverting criminal activity towards non-borrower households, and possibly increasing the level of
criminal activity. Thus, while in many ways beneﬁcial, microcredit is not without unwanted side-
eﬀects that so far have been unappreciated.
Our paper thus contributes to the research on externalities associated with private protection
against crime. The results show that the protection can have signiﬁcant aggregate negative exter-
nalities, consistent with the theoretical work focusing on publicly observable protection.
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Appendix A: Microﬁnance and externalities
To understand the impacts of microcredit on crime at the village level a straight forward way to proceed is
to assume that microcredit has externalities, either positive or negative. In the following we concentrate on
externalities microcredit creates through local labor markets. In our sample most of the landless households
and households with small landholdings have family members employed by households with large landhold-
ings. We assume that microcredit is used to improve the productivity of family's own land. This reduces
the supply of labor to other families, increasing the local wage. There is thus a positive externality to other
poor households, but a negative externality to richer households. This non-linearity in externalities together
with the non-linearity in self-protection with respect to income is the key to understand why village level
and individual level impacts of microcredit can be of opposite sign.
We assume that the distribution of land in the village is given by the cumulative density F (a) where
a denotes the acreage of the farm. We further assume (admittedly, against the facts), that microcredit
organizations only grant credit to eligible households, i.e., those with less than half an acre of land. The
number of eligible households is then F
(
1
2
) ≡ E. Consider now a farm with a acres of land. The income
of a household is
y (a, l; lo) = Aa
αl1−αo + w (l − lo)
where l = amount of labor the household has, lo = amount of labor used in the own farm and A = farm
productivity. We assume that in addition to working in their own farm the household members can also
work in other farms or in some other employment (the formulation contains also the possibility that in
some farms more labor is needed than is provided by the family members) for a wage w. This endogenous
wage is the opportunity cost for working in the own farm.28 We assume that all households maximize their
income given the amount of land owned. Thus the FOC for optimal labor input is
(1− α)A
(
a
lo
)α
− w = 0⇔
(
a
lo
)α
=
w
(1− α)A
giving
lo (a) = a
(
w
(1− α)A
)− 1
α
The local labor market clears when the aggregate demand for labor (lo aggregated over all farms) equals
aggregate labor supply (l multiplied by the mass of households):
N
∫ amax
0
a
(
w
(1− α)A
)− 1
α
dF (a) = Nl ⇔(
w
(1− α)A
)− 1
α
=
l
a
28 Notice that this means that the demand for labor in each farm is independent of the supply of labor
by the household members. For simplicity, we assume households of similar size.
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where N = total mass of households in the village, amax = largest farm size, and a = average farm size in
the village. The equilibrium wage is
w = (1− α)A
(
a
l
)α
.
This implies that the household income is given by
y (a) = A
(
l
a
)1−α
[a+ (1− α) (a− a)] .
Let us then introduce microcredit. We assume that microcredit improves farm productivity by specifying
that the farm production function is
(1 + µ)Aaαl1−αo
for households that receive a microcredit. Note that with a Cobb-Douglas function it does not matter
whether the microloan improves land or labor productivity or total factor productivity. Thus, following the
same calculations as above and assuming that share m (a) of the eligible households receive a microloan
(we assume loans are of the equal size for all households),29 the labor market equilibrium condition is now
∫ 1
2
0
a
(
w
(1− α) (1 + µ)A
)− 1
α
m (a) dF (a) +
∫ 1
2
0
a
(
w
(1− α)A
)− 1
α
(1−m (a)) dF (a)+∫ amax
1
2
a
(
w
(1− α)A
)− 1
α
dF (a) = Nl.
Here, the ﬁrst L.H.S. term is the labor demand of those eligible households who obtain microcredit; the
second the labor demand of those eligible households that do not obtain credit; and the last L.H.S. term
gives the labor demand of households that are ineligible for microcredit. This leads to the equilibrium
condition (
w
(1− α)A
)− 1
α
=
l
amc
where (the superscript mc refers to microcredit being available)
amc =
∫ 1
2
0
[
m (a) (1 + µ)
1
α + (1−m (a))
]
dF (a) +
∫ amax
1
2
adF (a) .
The equilibrium wage is then given by
w = (1− α)A
(
amc
l
)α
.
Thus, microcredit increases the wage rate by increasing the demand for labor. This is the externality
created by microcredit. By the envelope theorem, households hiring labor in net terms (the households
with large landholdings) experience a negative externality as their wage costs increase while the households
with low enough landholdings experience a positive externality. The reduced form expressions for household
29Many microcredit organizations give loans that are of ﬁxed size, though this ﬁxed size may be a function
of the number of past (and repaid) loans.
38
incomes with microcredit in the village are analogous to the ones without microcredit. The income of a
non-borrowing household (superscript mcNB for microcredit being available, but the household being a
non-borrower) can be written as
ymcNB (a) = A
(
l
amc
)1−α
[a+ (1− α) (amc − a)] .
The income of a household receiving credit (B for borrower) is
ymcB(a) = A
(
l
amc
)1−α [
a (1 + µ)
1
α + (1− α)
(
amc − a (1 + µ) 1α
)]
.
This model is used as the basis of the model for analyzing the cost of crime. One should note, however,
that there are other potential sources externalities: One could, for example, think of the incentive systems
of local police. If the microcredit clients get better protection against crime through the microcredit
institutions then local police has more resources to concentrate on the other households. In case the local
police is very corrupt and cooperates with the gangs, the non-borrowing households face more harassment
from the local police. With non-corrupt police these households get more protection.
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Table 2
Village Level Crime Descriptive Statistics
Village average
Type of crime % S.D. Daily consumption S.D.
Any crime 38.67 16.92 8.96 28.07
1 type of crime 24.78 14.53 .74 .85
2 types of crime 11.07 11.31 11.60 35.24
Wage loss 5.65 8.80 2.09 1.48
Medical costs 8.25 10.48 1.21 2.42
Lost goods 28.85 17.43 17.13 19.41
Money 13.41 10.69 2.30 3.87
Observations 54 54
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Table 3
Household Level Cost of Crime (Daily Consumption)
All Borrowers Non- Adjusted
households borrowers Wald test
Total cost of crime 5.35 1.83 6.85 7.46**
(26.84) (8.95) (31.43)
Wage loss .23 .07 .30 6.99***
(1.29) (.63) (1.48)
Medication .15 .04 .20 5.11**
(1.26) (.35) (1.48)
Lost goods 4.35 1.53 5.55 5.02**
(26.11) (8.54) (30.62)
Money .61 .19 .80 7.86***
(3.46) (1.86) (3.93)
Observations 1188 810 378
Conditional on being aﬀected
Total cost of crime 14.77 8.04 16.34 3.06*
(43.07) (17.38) (47.01)
N=344 N=185 N=159
Wage loss 5.21 3.45 5.48 3.54*
(3.48) (2.87) (3.53)
N=46 N=21 N=25
Medication 2.34 1.48 2.48 1.83
(4.43) (1.47) (4.76)
N=65 N=31 N=34
Lost goods 16.02 8.73 17.76 2.16
(48.26) (18.82) (52.90)
N=253 N=134 N=119
Money 4.74 3.11 5.00 1.77
(8.57) (7.04) (8.80)
N=104 N=45 N=59
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Table 8
The Eﬀect of Microcredit on Cost of Crime at the Village Level
Independent Variables 2SLS Reduced form
Proportion of borrower 4.87** - -
households (2.29) - -
Log of proportion of - 1.43** -
borrower households - (.73) -
Proportion of eligible - - 6.17**
households - - (2.86)
Household land .03* .03* .03*
(.02) (.01) (.01)
Household land square -.00007 -.00007 -.00007
(.00006) (.00006) (.00005)
Age of household head .03 .03 .05
(.05) (.05) (.053)
Proportion of landless households 1.91 -1.98 -2.29
(2.58) (2.57) (2.65)
Dwelling type 1.32 1.27 1.09
(1.22) (1.13) (1.11)
Highest grade completed .05 .04 .09
by household head (.12) (.12) (.14)
Distance of household dwelling .0004 .0003 .0005
to village entrance point (.0009) (.0009) (.0009)
R2 - - 0.22
F- test 41.31*** 30.05*** -
Notes: Reported numbers are coeﬃcient and bootstrapped (standard error). We employ weights that take
into account our sampling design and village size. All variables are village averages.
The sample size is 54 program villages .***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1, 5, and
10% levels. F-test is on the instrument in the 1st stage regression.
47
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.34
0.35
0.36
0.37
0.38
0.39
0.4
0.41
Figure 1a: CC of the poor
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Figure 1. Distribution of Cost of Crime as a Function of Landholdings
Figure 2. Market shares of the Leading Microcredit Lenders in Bangladesh
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